Introduction

This work considers the issue of European security and defence cooperation. Talk abounds about Europe as a ‘civilian power’ or as a ‘normative superpower’, which exercises ‘soft power’ in international relations. The touted effectiveness of these notions is predicated upon the ideal of a universal humanity. Human beings are understood as progressive social animals, infinitely malleable and ‘unconstrained’, in both our moral sentiment and rational potential. From this initial perception of human nature, it is considered that through the destruction of local tradition, and the assiduous application of reason to social interaction, humanity will come to understand the rationality of a particular conception of the good - styled as a universal - and will thereby come to live in concord within a universal and homogeneous end state of history.

Even as Europe engages in international efforts, the focus of which is the ascendency of this particular conception of humanity, I would posit that the foreign policy practitioners of Europe have never forgotten the centrality of power to international relations. Indeed, as this essay will argue, despite the inclusion of the welfare of humanity as the promulgated objective of European security and defence policy, the states of Europe are still mindful of the classic notion presented by the Prussian military philosopher Karl von Clausewitz, in his military treatise On War, that:

If bloody slaughter is a horrible spectacle, then it should only be a reason for treating war with more respect, but not for making the sword we bear blunter and blunter by degrees from feelings for humanity, until once again someone steps in with a sword that is sharp and hews away the arms from our body.

There is also the idea that Europe is an economic superpower and that its combined market area, balance of trade, and the strong value of the Euro, give it influence and
power in the world. This position is undoubtedly correct in some measure, as
economic power is a source of latent power and does produce influence; however, this
conception represents only a single aspect of aggregate power and influence properly
constituted. Moreover, as Oswald Spangler argued in *The Decline of the West*:

> He who is out for purely economic advantage—as the Carthaginians
> were in Roman times … is correspondingly incapable of purely political *thinking*. In the decisions of high politics he is ever deceived
> and made a tool of … moral sentiment.⁴⁻

This work, then, takes a different view from either the normative or economic idea of
Europe. My argument is grounded within the theoretical foundations of political
realism, and thus gives simultaneous attention to the effects of the material structure
of international relations and state pursuit of power. Thus, I follow Hans
Morgenthau’s prescription that:

> international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever
> the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and people may ultimately seek freedom,
> security, prosperity, or power itself. …But whenever they strive to
> realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by
> striving for power.⁶⁻

The states of Europe have clear objectives and goals internationally, some of which
are strict material interests and some of which are highly informed by European
values. Irrespective of the nature of Europe’s security objectives the means to obtain
these specified ends remain the same. The states of Europe need to cooperate in the
area of security and defence to maximize their relative power in order to ensure the
satisfaction of their desired goals.

This work is presented in six sections. The first discusses how cooperation in high
politics is often presented as a challenge to the neorealist or systemic realist paradigm.
The second section provides a discussion of the material and geographic origins of the
need for cooperation to satisfy the foreign policy objectives of the state of Europe. In
the third section I consider the descent of the world into the steady logic of the bipolar
Cold War era, illustrating how this system constrained European actions, thereby
limiting security and defence cooperation. The fourth section considers the re-
emergence of a will to power among the nation states of Europe, but one that is
situated within a broader cooperative framework of European action. The fifth section considers how this re-conceptualization of security has led to greater cooperative European action. Greater cooperation, in this case, is obtained as a result of two interrelated pressures. The sixth section considers the split in foreign policies that occurred as a result of the 2003 Iraq War. I then conclude with an analysis of a new European threat assessments, which indicates that by 2025 Europe will be faced with an increasing insecure position within the international system.

This work, therefore, establishes the likelihood of both persistent and greater European cooperation in security and defence. It responds to a simple research question: What are the prospects for future European cooperation in the areas of security and defence? In response, I argue that the major powers of the European Union will invariably pursue greater cooperation in security and defence in order to increase their material power relative to the other major powers in the system. The causes of this pursuit will vary, of course. This paper’s purpose, however, is to consider the logic of international action as it influences states. Thus, in order for Europe to act internationally, and to secure its promulgated security objectives, the states of Europe must pursue greater cooperation and increase their relative material power.

The Challenge of European Cooperation and the Pursuit of Power

European cooperation is often presented as a challenge to realist thinking. Central to this argument is the idea that the states of Europe appear to be pursuing absolute gains in preference to short-term relative gains. The assumption that states pursue relative gains is a derived conclusion from the broader neorealist argument that the international system is one of self-help. Neorealist theory presents an argument about the overarching material structure of international relations, which effectively places constraints upon the range of possible state action. It does not, therefore, dictate in a deterministic manner the ways in which a state will necessarily respond to these constraints. The self-help quality of the international system is predicted upon the causal effect of anarchy, where states, acting as unitary actors on the basis of exogenously given corporate interests, become functionally undifferentiated units. As Kenneth Waltz argues, ‘the theory makes assumptions about the interests and motives of states, rather than explaining them. What it does explain are the constraints
that confine all states. The clear perception of constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states. The constraints placed upon states limit, but do not exclude, the possibility of cooperation, particularly in those areas of state policy that are considered ‘high politics’, that is, the areas of defence and security.

As Adrian Hyde-Price has argued, neorealist theory can ‘shed considerable light on the systemic pressures that “shape and shove EU member states”’ international behaviour. Persistent cooperation is explicable, then, given the arguments about international structure and the assumptions of state agency allowed for in neorealist theory. Thus, neorealism provides a set of theoretical boundaries for state action, while states themselves retain considerable room for political manoeuvring. As Waltz recognized:

with skill and determination structural constraints can sometimes by countered. Virtuosos transcend the limits of their instruments and break the constraints of systems that bind lesser performers.

Indeed, the perception of this crucial political dynamic is central to neorealist arguments about European cooperation, which argue from a structural perspective that the European countries will increase their security cooperation. What these works leave underspecified, however, is the theory of foreign policy that underlies a state’s political action in its response to structural pressures. Thus, even if one concedes that the structure of the international system can pressure states towards cooperation in security, a careful reader is left questioning the direction and meaning of European security and defence cooperation.

What is implicit in the structural argument, however, is the reliance on some form of political realism within their considerations. I will argue that political realism, as a theory of foreign policy, provides the most coherent guide for the states of Europe. I explicitly maintain, then, ‘that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanations of traditional realism’. I give due deference, therefore, to changes to the international structure, but only in the manner in which they influence a state’s perceptions of security and the international system. My primary focus, however, remains centred upon the European states’
pursuit of power, through greater cooperation, as a means to satisfy their international objectives.

The Distribution of Power and the States of Europe: Why Cooperation is Necessary

It is important to stress that my work considers cooperation in defence and security, and not integration. The difference is that integration would result in the harmonization of policy and outcomes, as decisions, once reached, would become binding upon the member states. The intergovernmental structure of European defence and security cooperation - promulgated in the ‘Second Pillar’ of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 - precludes integration in the short to medium term and, therefore, the harmonization of security policy. In contrast, as Seth Jones has observed, ‘security cooperation’ occurs when states adjust their foreign policy and defence behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others. States cooperate to realize gains that are unachievable through individual action; policymaking is achieved multilaterally rather than unilaterally.\textsuperscript{xv}

In the present context of European security and defence cooperation, power remains the means to fulfill the international desires of political actors. Increased cooperation in security and defence, therefore, is undertaken in order to maximize the relative power of Europe. This cooperation, in turn, enables the European states ‘to realize gains that are [held to be] unachievable through individual action’.\textsuperscript{xvi}

An important place to begin such a discussion of cooperative behaviour is in the early stages of the Cold War, with an analytical focus on France, Britain and Germany. From each state’s national character and history, these nations perceived themselves as being Great Powers. Each state was decimated by the World Wars and in consequence, each moved from Great Power status into a secondary rank. Germany was partitioned between Soviet and American spheres of political influence and initially forbidden from pursuing military rearmament, thus reducing its international power.

For the two Allied nations of Britain and France the decline was slower but nevertheless perceptible. In 1956 during the Suez Crisis - an event precipitated by
Britain and France - the actions taken by the United States clearly demonstrated the change in the distribution of power within the international system. As Henry Kissinger notes, the Suez Crisis ‘was the first and only time that the United States was to vote with the Soviet Union against its closest allies’\textsuperscript{xvii}. British and French troops were forced to withdraw from the Sinai as a result of international pressure. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that the presence of international pressure is not the feature of this situation which signals the decline of British and French relative power. All states in the international system are subject to exogenous pressures, which attempt to push or pull their foreign policies in any given direction. It was not the presence of international pressure, then, but the British and the French lack of sufficient power and authority to overcome this pressure, that illustrates their relative decline.

This lack of power did not go unnoticed, however. Shortly following the events in the Suez, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer reportedly stated to the French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau:

\begin{quote}
France and England will never be powers comparable to the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor Germany, either. There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world; that is to unite to make Europe. England is not ripe for it but the affair of Suez will help to prepare her spirit for it. We have not time to waste: Europe will be your revenge.\textsuperscript{xviii}
\end{quote}

The central issue in security cooperation, that ‘states cooperate to realize gains that are unachievable through individual action’\textsuperscript{xix} is clearly present in the early beginnings of European cooperation. I do not mean for this to be taken as a teleological or deterministic argument, as the course of history is never set. I merely want to indicate that the initial sentiment and politics surrounding European cooperation involved the issue of relative power and that the former Great Powers were keenly attenuate to these concerns. Moreover, it stands to reason that such considerations have likely persisted throughout the successive stages of European integration.

A crucial point is that the states of Europe recognized that the changing distribution of power within the international system affected their ability to pursue their
international objectives. The former Great Powers knew, then, that without security cooperation, their power, relative to the great continental powers of the United States and the Soviet Union, would never be comparable.\textsuperscript{xx} Indeed, as Morgenthau notes in reference to national power, ‘it is not by accident that the two most powerful nations today, the United States and the Soviet Union, come closest to being self-sufficient [a result of their continental size] in the raw materials necessary for modern industrial production and control at least the access to the sources of those raw material that they do not themselves produce’.\textsuperscript{xxi} To obtain their desired ends within the international context, the states of Europe needed to cooperate in order to increase the aggregate power relative to both the United States and the Soviet Union.

At this point a clearer discussion of the concept of power needs to be given. At its most fundamental, as German Sociologist Max Weber argues, ‘by power is meant that opportunity existing within a social relationship which permits one to carry out one’s own will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity rests’.\textsuperscript{xxii} This paper is expressing the notion, then, that power is expressed solely in the exercise of one’s will over another social party. The multiple forms by which this power is manifest must therefore be recognized. Hard power can be considered the product of military arms, which force others to do your will, or, derivatively, power can be exercised through the threat of violent action and civilian suffering.\textsuperscript{xxiii} Indeed, it is this second variation of power that is often overlooked, or at the very least, neglected for its more unpalatable qualities. As Thomas Schelling has observed, ‘it is extraordinary how many treatises on war and strategy have declined to recognize that the power to hurt has been, throughout history, a fundamental character of military force and fundamental to the diplomacy based on it’.\textsuperscript{xxiv} To these primary aspects of state power, needs to be added the concept of ‘soft power’, as articulated by Joseph Nye. In this conceptualization of power, influence is obtained by having others come to want what you want; a country thus obtains its desired ends in a fashion that does not seem to explicitly rest on the ability to invariably force compliance.\textsuperscript{xxv} Soft power was not intended as an unlimited substitute for hard power, instead it was meant to provide an easier and more humane way of obtaining ones goals. Invariably, however, soft power rests on an implicit foundation of hard power; even as the influence that is obtained from the threat of violence is always underwritten by the actual material capability to do harm.\textsuperscript{xxvi} Underwriting even the gentlest form of power, then, is the
concern over greater material ability. As Samuel Huntington argues, ‘[w]hat … makes culture and ideology attractive?’ That is, what makes the instruments of soft power appealing?

They become attractive when they are seen as rooted in material success and influence. Soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power. Increases in hard economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of other peoples and greatly increases its attractiveness to other peoples.

This extended discussion of power will serve as a basis for the subsequent discussion of European security and defence integration. Indeed, the relevancy of cooperation in the areas of defence and security gain increased salience, as they provide the foundation for the other forms of power and influence. Thus, European influence and security requires effective military power, as British Prime Minister Tony Blair illustrated in March of 1999: ‘we Europeans need to restructure our defence capabilities so that we can project force, can deploy troops, ships and planes beyond our home bases and sustain them there, equipped to deal with whatever level of conflict they may face.’ Any consideration of European security and defence cooperation, then, is at some level always discussing both the ability and the likelihood that Europe will engage in the aggregation of military power for the broader purpose of influence.

The Attempts at Cooperation and the Logic of the Cold War

During the more or less static period of the Cold War, the United States responded to the structural logic of the bipolar distribution of power with the perception that there was a ‘self-dependency of parties, [a] clarity of dangers, [and a] certainty about who has to face them’. America’s great material power produced expansive global interests, which included protecting and restoring the material power of Europe to contain the threat of the Soviet Union. European states were able to rely, and arguably ‘free ride’, upon an explicit American security guarantee. The European states took advantage of this reprieve from the condition of anarchy to pursue economic and political integration. As Robert Gilpin argues: ‘states attempt to create an international political environment and rules of the system that will be conducive
to the fulfillment of their political, economic, and ideological interests’. The states of Europe undertook the processes of integration to shape Europe into a political environment that fulfilled the lead states economic, political and ideological objectives.

In the area of security and defence cooperation, numerous failed attempts were made during the Cold War. These attempts can be seen as efforts to establish a European sphere of security and military influence through intergovernmental cooperation. As Seth Jones illustrates, however, the structure of the international system and the continued presence of a security threat from the Soviet Union were not conducive to persistent cooperation in defence and security. According to the structural logic, limited cooperation resulted during the Cold War for two reasons. First, the benefits of free riding on the American security guarantee were too great. Second, cooperation in defence and security would have weakened the transatlantic alliance resulting in American Isolationism and a retraction of the American security guarantee provided through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As then-British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden noted in 1952: ‘[European integration] is something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do …We know that if we were to attempt it, we should relax the springs of our action in the Western Democratic cause and in the Atlantic Association which is the expression of that cause’. These two reasons limited any serious attempts at security and defence cooperation during the Cold War.

In the period of years between 1989-1991, however, as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, there emerged a new distribution of power within the international system. During this time, arguments were presented that stressed the re-emergence of power politics in Europe and a return of traditional nationalist sentiment. These arguments treated changes to the distribution of power within the international system deterministically, effectively overlooking the fact that changes in structure can be interpreted and influenced by state foreign policy. The counter-argument has also been made, that rather than limiting cooperation and pressuring towards the breakdown of Europe, the new distribution of power actually promotes European cooperation. As noted earlier, however, neorealist theory requires, indeed it
necessitates, the presence of state agency. States are always expected to decide the ways in which they will respond to systemic changes.

These works that argue from the structural level of generality are valuable. The focus of this work, however, on the necessary will to power of the nation-states of Europe, presents a unit-level and complementary augmentation of the changing logic of international structure. In what follows I will consider how Europe has redefined its conception of security, in response to the changing international system, to maximize its power and how this redefinition of security has also necessitated a critical rethinking of the age old concept of victory.

The End of the Cold War and the Reemergence of a European Security

Shortly before the end of the Cold War, in 1987, only 49% of Europeans indicated that they thought Europe would possess a common military force by the year 2000. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1991, the level of respondents rose to 57%; this change in public perception clearly indicates a corollary change in perceptions towards the idea of cooperative defence. There are two factors that contributed to this change in public opinion. First, was the collapse of the Soviet Union—that is, a change in the distribution of power in the international system. The political elite recognized the changing systemic pressures and the possibility of greater European action. In February of 1990, for example, during an interview on German reunification, then-French President Mitterrand stated that:

> the main thing, for me, is for Europe to take up its true place in the world again after the self-destruction of two world wars. In short, I expect Europeans to keep in mind, as I do, a paraphrase of that well-known expression, “Let Europe take care of itself”.

The international context was ripe for cooperation in security and defence.

The second change was in the emergent possibility of greater European action. It was in many respects, then, the 1991 Gulf War that persuaded both the European public and political elites that the idea of greater aggregate power was desirable, given their perceptions of the new international security environment. The intervention in the Persian Gulf was an almost unprecedented case of the United Nations acting against a classical form of interstate aggression. On 2 August 1990, Iraqi military forces
invaded the contiguous country of Kuwait. By November the UN Security Council had passed ten resolutions. These Security Council actions had set out a legal framework in preparation for UN military action. Military action was subsequently carried out under UN authorization, by a US led coalition.

These changes entailed two clear implications for European security cooperation. First, they raised the possibility of the exercise of power within a legitimate framework of action. Indeed, this point remains central to the European Union’s (EU’s) security strategy. The second point is that the overwhelming quality of this Allied military victory gave rise to greater calls for European capabilities that could

perform similarly. As Manigart and Marlier illustrate: ‘as a consequence of the Gulf War, 74% of European citizens believed the E.C. should have a common foreign policy, 64% that it should speed up its political, economic and monetary integration, while 62% would like to see the E.C. have a common European military intervention force’. The increased relative power of Europe remains central. Regardless of the stated causes for the increases in public support, whether it followed from a desire to support the international liberal order; to have Europe act legitimately within a UN mandate; or as a personal act of lustration in seeing European forces supporting a particular conception of the good; the only functional means by which a cooperative and autonomous Europe could come to act internationally was the result of the same phenomenon: the acquisition and use of material power.

On 19 June 1992, the states of the Western European Union (WEU) outlined the goals of European security and defence cooperation. The objectives of the WEU security cooperation, labeled the ‘Petersburg Tasks,’ would cover humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, crisis management, as well as peacemaking. Security was being redefined in a specific way, adding a degree of humanity to the concerns of high politics; despite this re-conceptualization of the meaning of security, the means to obtain these ends remained unchanged. The full execution of these tasks required the acquisition of material capabilities, which underscores the WEU’s need to aggregate power.
The new security objectives correspond to the societal imperative of the post Cold War publics, where value is placed on multilateral action, humanitarian causes, and peaceful coexistence. A consequence of a clearer correlation between security and the societal imperative, the overall salience of European security issues was increasing. Despite the increased salience of security concerns, the defence budgets of European nations were decreasing, thereby limiting the ability of each individual state to contribute to the European defence and the satisfaction of the newly promulgated security objectives. Given, then, the emerging global vision of European security interests and the decreased capability of the individual states - particularly, Britain, France, and Germany - to satisfy these ends, cooperation in the area of security and defence seems both materially and politically prudent.

In 1832, Clausewitz expressed the dictum ‘that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means’.

Europe’s military doctrine, indeed, the delineation of a theatre of operation for Europe’s military capabilities, must follow from a political conception. A conception that will be predicated upon a specifically European strategic culture, but will be driven by the interests of the major states: Britain, France, and Germany. Through the institutionalization of security cooperation in the Treaty of Maastricht, Europe has begun to fashion a particular strategic culture. I would maintain that this is not necessarily the same as the social constructivist idea of mutually constitutive and intersubjectively developed identities and interests. I would note, however, that there is not necessarily a contradiction between social constructivism and political realism, as both theories are historically contingent and rooted in an actor’s perception of events. I think, then, that the emergent European strategic culture strongly parallels Thucydides’ notion that an ‘identity of interest both among cities and among individuals is the surest of all guarantees’. Britain, France, and Germany will still seek to control the policy output of the European security and defence institutions, in a continued effort to serve their respective national interests. The European identity of interest, when and where it does exist, will be derived from the fact that no European state can consistently influence international events on its own. The incentive for either increased conflict or cooperation, therefore, is necessitated by each state’s relative position within the international system. If no identity of interests exists, then conflict is increasingly likely, as states will pursue
strategic and military gains intended to enhance their relative position. However, that the nations of Europe desire to obtain similar security ends, as promulgated in the Petersburg tasks, illustrates that there is currently a strong identity of national interest.

The Denial of the Will and External Disregard for European Power
Greater cooperation seems increasingly necessary each time that the states of Europe have failed to influence the course of history. That is, every time their will has been denied, their power disregarded, and their prestige tarnished, Europe has responded by increasing the qualitative degree of their security cooperation. Europe attempted to act internationally during the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992-1995. After a daunting and failed effort to reconcile the tensions in the Balkan region, the EU forces were ready and willing to turn control of the mission over to the United States and NATO forces. The conclusion of this crisis, in the American negotiated Dayton Peace Accord, was an erosion of EU prestige, which created a lasting memory that is still recalled. As Christopher Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations remarked to the European Parliament on 17 January 2001, ‘too often in the past, take the Balkans for example, we have just not been able to respond with efficiency or timeliness that developments in the real world demand’.ii

The power of the EU, relative to even warring factions within the Balkan region, had been shown to be insufficient to allow Europe to assert its will and obtain its desired security objectives. One of the greatest impetus for aggregating power, then, results from the denial of a nation’s will. Europe had failed to assert its will, and this demonstrated its lack of power and authority. Indeed, as an exogenous security and defence area of grave concern, the Balkan region has routinely furthered European security and defence cooperation. As Jolyon Howorth has argued, for example:

The urgency of responding to the external ‘events’ has forced policy actors to co-ordinate their approaches. Whereas in the summer of 1991 Berlin, Paris and London adopted very different approaches to the crisis in Yugoslavia, ten years later it is difficult to detect even a nuance of difference between these three capitals on Balkan policy.iii

A few years after the Bosnia Crisis, then, at Saint-Malo in December of 1998, the British and the French delegations came together on the issue of European defence capabilities, even though the British government had previously opposed such an
initiative only a year earlier at the EU Council summit in Amsterdam, in 1997. The Saint-Malo Declaration states that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis’. The British and French calls for autonomous action and capabilities are particularly telling in regard to Europe’s acquisition of power to pursue its desired ends. As the Saint-Malo declaration marked ‘the first overt use of that word [autonomous] in any European security blueprint’. Perceptions of inadequate defence resources and power were contributory affects, which were influencing European defence cooperation.

In 1999, with American and NATO intervention in Kosovo, European perceptions of limited power worsened and the European inability to assert its will internationally was once again flaunted. The Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council demonstrate this point. The Council members declared in 1999, that:

> We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.

The Presidency Conclusions stated further that in order to satisfy the ‘Petersburg tasks’, ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO’. Europe recognized again that in order to secure its desired ends in the international context, power was necessary and it had to be exercisable external to the NATO framework, which remained largely dominated by the United States. If Europe was to be a global actor, power commensurate to that position was necessary.

Certainly, some steps had previously been taken to ensure greater coordination in defence and security policy. Article 26 of the Amsterdam Treaty, for example, established a High Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ‘to improve the coordination and centralization of foreign policymaking’. The centralized coordination of European security policy was thus given a figure head.
The High Representative would be able to contribute to the discourse surrounding European security and defence issues through a policy planning group, as well as an early warning conflict unit that would assess threats to European, as well as international, peace and security.\textsuperscript{lx}

Also, in December of 1999, the European Union laid out the Helsinki ‘headline’ goals, which called for the creation of a rapid reaction force of 50,000 – 60,000 personnel by 2003. Europe’s inability to assert its will independently of NATO and American influence was quickly becoming politically unacceptable. As Francois Heisbourg has illustrated the ‘constructive ambiguity’ of European integration had reached its limit in the area of security and defence.\textsuperscript{lxi} And as I argued previously, for defence and security operations to be effective, clear political direction is necessary. Indeed, in the area of joint intergovernmental European action this notion becomes increasingly important, because the satisfaction of the political directives contributes to Europe’s ability to claim victory in security and defence operations. As Robert Mandel recently illustrated in 2007, the very definition of victory in the contemporary security environment has undergone a substantive shift.\textsuperscript{lxii} Now states must account for both the relatively simple obtainment of military victory, as well as a more dynamic form of strategic victory, a point that corresponds to Europe’s re-conceptualizing of security along more humanitarian lines in the Petersburg tasks.\textsuperscript{lxiii}

The salience of strategic victory is not new, of course. As the Prussian General Helmut von Moltke once decried in 1887:

\begin{quote}
The days of cabinet wars are past; now we have only the people’s war … There is not one […] power] that can be so completely overcome in one or even in two campaigns that it will be forced to conclude an onerous peace; not one that will be unable to rise again, after a year, to renew the struggle.\textsuperscript{lxiv}
\end{quote}

To maintain the strategic gains that are obtained through military victory requires longer term strategic considerations. Indeed, given the inherently subjective nature of any definition of victory, properly conceptualizing the issue in defence and security operations becomes particularly salient.\textsuperscript{lxv} For the European Union, then, conceptualizing positive outcomes to military operations is especially important, as ‘victory has the capacity to “influence the destiny of nations, shaping alliance
behaviour, perceptions of credibility and resolve, post-conflict expectations, and notions of revenge”.

To properly accomplish this re-conceptualization required specific political direction, rather than vague policy declarations. Moreover, material power and prestige need to be considered in tandem, as mutually constitutive elements of Europe’s position within the international system. The next logical step would be that Europe required a defence agency, to bring together the politics and the material resources which are necessary for a clear exertion of will internationally. Indeed, on 12 July 2004, the European Council did establish the European Defence Agency to coordinate resources, to develop Europeans capabilities, promote European research and development, and assess international peace and security issues.

At every instance, then, when European power proved to be inadequate to accomplish Europe’s international objectives, greater cooperation in security and defence was seen a necessity. In accordance with certain social expectations, then, Europe has responded to this necessity in a pristinely human fashion, by attempting to overcome it. As Hannah Arendt argues in *The Human Condition*: ‘that same necessity that, from the standpoint of the public realm, shows only its negative aspect as a deprivation of freedom possesses a driving force whose urgency is unmatched by the so called higher desires and aspirations of man’. The specified higher ends of European security and defence policy are always to be subordinated in times of necessity to pursue of power. And as Michel Foucault argues, in the context of modern warfare: ‘Wars are no longer waged in the name of the sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity’. Indeed, material power represents the necessity of international life.

**The Morass of the Iraq War and the Gradual Re-emergence of European Defence**

In 2002-2003, when Great Britain followed the United States and participated in the invasion of Iraq, the functional persistence European security and defence cooperation was put into question. Indeed, the discordant interests between Great Britain and the other Continental powers gave rise to some speculative discussion about a defence
arrangement that would include Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg, but would exclude Britain. During a summit on 29 April 2003 the leaders of these four ‘core’ countries came together to propose a security arrangement that would establish a European Policy Planning Staff, a move that lessened Europe’s reliance on NATO’s organizational structure and thus placed tremendous strain on the Transatlantic relationship.\textsuperscript{lxxi}

This move was a response to both public and elite political perceptions about the Iraq War, but it was more than simply a defence initiative. As Charles Grant argued: ‘the French and German Governments had for years toyed with the idea of establishing some sort of core Europe, which would provide leadership to an enlarged European Union’.\textsuperscript{lxxii}

The discussion, then, of what came to be known as the ‘Tervuren Initiative’, was shrouded in opposing interests, with Britain attempting to increase its power through its influence in Washington, while Germany and France attempted to form a core group to control the security and defence outputs of ESDP. Such tensions could seem to entail the gradual, yet inevitable, re-emergence of salient nation-states within Europe. I would argue, however, that this will not be the case.

The divergence of interests was the result of a specific event in world politics, and because we are discussing cooperation and not integration, we should in fact expect that at times when state interests diverge, ESDP’s effectiveness will be limited. Indeed, as Anand Menon argues:

\begin{quote}
the conflict has also had several salutary consequences for European Defence policy aspirations. … [T]he impact of the crisis has been to make explicit the tensions within the design of EU security policies that hitherto had been implicit.\textsuperscript{lxxiii}
\end{quote}

The tensions, having been illustrated, are now the subject of debate and political renegotiation along the lines of a European political consensus. Indeed, new EU projects to enhance civil-military arrangement, and the Capabilities Development Plan agreed to on 14 December 2006, both point to a continued negotiation and cooperation between the major powers of the European Union.\textsuperscript{lxxiv} As the 18 June
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2007 Presidency Report on ESDP indicates, the EU’s security and defence operations are far-ranging with EU mission in Somalia, Darfur, and the Congo, as well as police training missions in the Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. Despite the setbacks that have resulted from the divergence of state interests, European security and defence cooperation continues, and increased efforts at coordinated through the European Defence Agency will continue to increase the salience and power of a ‘United Europe’.

Indeed, Europe has increasingly become the policy focus of its member states. As then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder stated in 2005:

> As part of the European Union Germany today feels that it shares responsibility for international stability and order … NATO’s presence in Afghanistan had highlighted how helpful its military can be even in distant crises. However, it is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.

**Conclusion: The Persistence of European Cooperation towards the Aggregation of Power**

In response to the challenge that European security cooperation is more of a passing fad than a true project of emergent statehood, tensions, such as those emerging during the Iraq War, must be considered relative to the overall need and incentive for a European defence and security project. If any European state could consistently act internationally, without heavy prejudice to NATO or the other EU members, then the likelihood of further European cooperation in security and defence would be limited.

However, no single European state has the resources to consistently accomplish this task. The strongest state, Germany, could not even attempt such an action, as any withdraw from the EU project would invariably produce balancing behaviour in the other European Great Powers. The need to be secure and the security threats that are facing Europe will not diminish because of lack of political will and military capabilities, and so cooperation in security and defence is increasingly dictated by international realities.
Certainly, divergent interests will retard the progress of ESDP. As long as the distribution of power within the European system remains as it is, however, the major European states will continue to pursue ever greater European security and defence cooperation to obtain their international objectives through the collective use of power.

Truly, Europe is not secure enough to be able to avoid international action. As An Initial Long-term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs indicates, Europe faces numerous security threats: A decline in relative economic capabilities, an aging population and low fertility rates of around 1.5%, as well as the raising cost of public finance that take resources away from defence spending. In addition, the EU suffers from a huge energy dependency, where ‘by 2025, Europe will be externally dependent for 90% of its oil and 80% of its gas. …in other ways, European security interests may be directly or indirectly challenged by tensions arising not only in the near neighbourhood but also further a field’.\textsuperscript{lxxvii}

Europe is, then, increasingly responsive to a set of global interests. To meet the increased security and defence needs, the states of Europe will invariably have to act in concert, through persistent and institutionalized cooperation. The alternative—that is, the return of a hegemonic and revisionist Germany is implausible. Indeed, Europe is truly more powerful as a global actor than any single, or group of, European states acting together on the basis of some short term alliance. As the Europe Security Strategy (2003), A Secure Europe in a Better World, posits, ‘the increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’.\textsuperscript{lxxviii} To engage in the world is to assert its authority; to maintain and increase its prestige, and to accommodate its definition of security and victory in military operations. To obtain all of these objectives requires that Europe increases its relative material power. Thus, the objective of political realism is satisfied and can be seen as a guide for the actions of the states of Europe.

To act in international politics is to assert power over others whose interests differ from your own. Power is a measure of one’s ability to have others respond positively
to your will, even in the presence of forces to the contrary. Europe cannot maintain a
global presence without an increase in its material power, relative to the other major
states in the system. Cooperation in the area of defence and security is necessitated,
therefore, by the logic of the international structure, but it is also drawn by the
inexorable facts of social existence in international politics.

Notes

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3 von Clausewitz, Karl, cited in, Waltz, Kenneth, Man the State and War, New York: Columbia
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4 For the sources of national power see: Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations 7th ed., Toronto:
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10 Ibid., p. 122. Emphasis added.
11 Hyde-Price, Adrian, ‘‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique,’’ Journal of European Public
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15 Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation, p. 8
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18 German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, cited in, Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 547
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20 Kissinger, Henry, Does America Need a Foreign Policy: Towards a Diplomacy for the 21st Century
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24 Ibid., p. 33.
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Mandel, “Reassessing Victory in Warfare”, 461.
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