How Has the Intensification of Federal Immigration Enforcement Since 2017 Affected Labour Supply in California's Agricultural Industry?

Molly Wild

Washington Intern, 2026



Flinders University

Jeff Bleich Centre for Democracy and Disruptive Technologies

The Washington Internship Program

Since its founding in 2000, the Washington Internship Program has provided over 150 Flinders University students with the opportunity to experience political life in the US Congress, and manage the task, priorities and pressures of a congressional office. Interns work as political professionals, placed in offices of United States senators, members of the US House of Representatives, and on congressional standing committees.

While in Washington, interns will conduct research on a project of interest to their congressional office and to themselves.

When interns return from Washington, they will give a formal oral presentation on their experiences in the program, and complete a written report.

Find out more at flinders.edu.au/jbc

About Molly

Molly Wild completed the Washington Internship in 2026 in the office of Congressman Jim Costa (D-CA21). Molly currently works Turner Freeman Lawyers while completing her Bachelor of Laws and Legal Practice (Honours) and Bachelor of International Relations and Political Science. Connect with her on LinkedIn!

© Flinders University, 2026

Except where noted, this work is licensed under CC BY 4.0

Images sourced under licence from Canva are excluded from the CC BY licence.

jbc@flinders.edu.au

How Has the Intensification of Federal Immigration Enforcement Since 2017 Affected Labour Supply in California's Agricultural Industry?

Table of Contents

Abstract ***2***

Introduction ***3***

California's Agricultural Industry **3**

California's Reliance on Undocumented Immigrants 3

Immigration Enforcement in the United States **4**

Politicisation of Immigration Policy 4

Data and Methodology ***5***

Findings ***8***

Intensification of Immigration Enforcement **8**

Increase in Immigration-Related Arrests/Deportations 8

..... 10

Increases in Funding 10

Immigration Policy Changes 11

Consequences on Agricultural Labour Shortages in California **14**

Detention and Deportation of the Workforce 15

ICE Deterring the Imported Workforce 15

Public Fear 16

Discussion ***17***

Alternative Contributing Factors **19**

COVID-19 19

California Droughts 19

Conclusion ***20***

Bibliography ***22***

Abstract

Given that California is the largest agricultural producer in the United States and is home to a sizable immigrant community, this study analyses the impact of increased immigration enforcement on the State's agricultural labour supply since 2018 (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 24). I employed a systematic literature review to synthesise peer-reviewed literature, government reports, and congressional resources published between 2018 and 2026, and evaluate the relationship between intensified immigration enforcement and California's agricultural labour supply. In order to bolster the existing literature, a quantitative examination of ICE arrest, detention, and deportation statistics was conducted, reinforcing the argument that immigration enforcement in California has notably escalated since President Trump's first term in January 2018 (Capps et al., 2018, pp. 7, 23; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement compiled by The Deportation Project, 2026). Alternative measures of immigration enforcement revealed expanded funding and policy changes, such as the reinstatement of the Immigration and Nationality Act's Section 287(g) and Secure Communities programs (East et al., 2026, pp. 2-3; Reichlin-Melnick, 2026; Kolker, 2025). Additionally, through the detention and deportation of the workforce and the deterrence of imported workers due to public fear of immigration enforcement activities, a 20-40% reduction in California's agricultural workforce is predicted (Li, 2025). This is supported by over 15% of farmers already reporting labour losses attributed to immigration enforcement (Rutledge & Win, 2026, pp. 2-3; Handweker, 2026). The discussion argues that labour shortages arise from multiple mechanisms rather than from arrests, detentions, and deportations alone. Although detention directly reduces workforce availability, fear and deterrence appear to display broader behavioural effects that may be reinforced by increased media visibility of immigration enforcement activities. Ultimately, intensified immigration enforcement through a combination of mechanisms significantly contributes to California's agricultural labour shortages with further scientific research needed to substantiate my findings derived from existing literature.

Introduction

California's Agricultural Industry

I was placed in the office of Democratic Congressman Jim Costa, who represents California's 21st district, encompassing the Fresno and Tulare Counties (*Jim Costa - About*, 2012). During my placement, I received many calls from constituents expressing significant fear of ICE's presence in the district, which sparked my interest in the topic. Many stakeholders in CA21's agricultural industry who met with Congressman Costa identified the intensification of immigration enforcement as a major concern for ensuring an adequate labour supply in the lead-up to the harvest season. California is a major agricultural state in America, generating over $310 billion in revenue in 2024, making it the world's fourth-largest economy (Champlin, 2026). The success of the industry is attributable to the wide variety of specialty crops, such as pistachios, almonds and grapes, that California is uniquely suited to grow (Prewitt, 2026, p. 1). However, these specialty crops often require labour-intensive harvesting, and an insufficient labour supply can result in significant losses, with crops left to rot in the field (Rutledge and Taylor, 2019). To ensure that labour supply meets demand, many producers rely on immigrant workers, including over 800,000 Latino immigrants in California alone (Kostandini et al., 2014, p. 172). Producers rely on immigrant workers because there are not enough native workers to meet demand for seasonal harvesting, regardless of the state of the economy or the financial benefits offered (Clemens, 2013, p. 2; Peri & Sparber, 2009). However, increased red tape and costs have complicated the visa process for incoming documented seasonal workers, leading to a reliance on undocumented immigrant farm labour.

California's Reliance on Undocumented Immigrants

There are two H-class temporary visas that provide work rights to foreign nationals in the United States (Costa, 2022, p. 18). The H-2A seasonal agricultural work visa allows foreign-born workers to work during the harvest season across the United States (Costa, 2022, p. 1). Alternatively, the H-2B visa covers non-agricultural work. The H-2B visa is not directly relevant to this report; however, it is often discussed alongside the H-2A visa in the literature (Costa, 2022, p. 18). The H-class visas are expensive and "highly bureaucratic", restricting farmers' legal options for meeting their labour needs (Minkoff-Zern et al., 2022, p. 43). The framework for these visas leaves workers vulnerable to abuse before they arrive in the United States, and to illegal fees charged by third-party recruiters, which can result in debt owed to these lenders to obtain work rights (Costa, 2022, p. 11). Further, H-2A visa holders are excluded from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), meaning their work experiences are not monitored, leaving them susceptible to poor and inhumane working conditions (UC Davis, 2024). H-2A visa

holders do not possess the same rights under antidiscrimination laws in the United States; they are often paid below minimum wage and lack any pathway to permanent immigration status. This provides little incentive for workers to obtain this visa (Costa, 2022, p. 11-17). As such, farm labour demand in California is filled by undocumented workers to evade these costs (Kostandini et al., 2014, p. 172). Of the over 800,000 Latinx agricultural workers in California, an estimated 50% remain undocumented due to these issues (Medel-Herrero et al., 2023, p. 15). Given the importance of undocumented immigrants to maintaining California's agricultural production, the comparative value of purported increased border security through ICE activities against the State's economic interests should be analysed.

Immigration Enforcement in the United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is a subsidiary agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS was formed through the Homeland Security Act in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack (Johnson & Hunter, 2016, p. 160; Aziz, 2021, p. 136). After 9/11, immigration policy shifted from simply border management to a high-level national security and terrorism prevention, particularly focusing on the perpetrators' Islamic faith (Montange, 2022, p. 336). It also inspired the "enforcement first" approach to interior immigration management, in which detentions and deportations are preferred to legislative immigration reform (Hooks & Lengefeld, 2022, pp. 2–3). ICE was formed in 2003 as DHS's interior enforcement body, responsible for domestic immigration control. It operates through two divisions: Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020). Under 8 U.S. Code § 1226, ICE is tasked with apprehending and detaining aliens, which are any non-citizen or US national, pending a decision on whether they should be removed (Office of the Law Revision Counsel, 2025). ICE's enforcement purpose is to ensure the "arrest and removal of all those who undermine the safety of our communities", implying that aliens threaten the domestic safety of Americans, consistent with the sentiment behind the formation of DHS and ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2020). The idea of immigration as a national security concern is institutionalised, politicised and leveraged to appeal to voters.

Politicisation of Immigration Policy

Immigration has remained a significant policy focus in the United States for the last 50 years, but the politicisation of the topic and the resulting polarisation have grown since President Trump's inauguration in 2017 (Nagel, 2019). These election results, however, were predicated on an increase in polarisation that began long before Trump's

campaign, leading to a generational gap in the 90s, with younger Americans favouring socially liberal ideals compared to more conservative older Americans (Inglehart & Norris, 2019, pp. 331–367). Further, far-right rhetoric, commonly based on anti-immigration sentiment, also boomed, with the number of far-right hate groups rising significantly from 497 in 1999 to 1018 in 2001 (Aziz, 2021, p. 138). In 2016, Trump gained support by appealing to popular discontent, placing blame for domestic struggles on immigrants, and offering voters a simplified 'solution' to complex domestic policy issues (Inglehart & Norris, 2019, pp. 331–367). In January 2017, President Trump signed an executive order expanding interior immigration enforcement policies by allowing police officers to exercise immigration enforcement powers of ICE agents (the 287(g) program) and reinstating the previously discontinued Secure Communities program, increasing information sharing between ICE and local law enforcement (Pierce & Capps, 2017, pp. 1–4). Trump's ethno-nationalist policies support mass deportations of immigrants whom he argued were criminals and were draining public government services and welfare, meaning "genuine" Americans were consequently unable to access them (Inglehart & Norris, 2019, pp. 331–367). In the first year of Trump's presidency alone, far-right hate groups rose from 917 in 2016 to 1020 in 2018, suggesting that Trump's support of xenophobic ideals fuelled a rise in organisational racial and cultural hate (Aziz, 2021, p. 138). The political context in which immigration policy has changed in the United States is vital to examining whether these policy changes have measurably affected California's agricultural labour supply.

Data and Methodology

The research question requires measuring the intensification of federal interior immigration enforcement and the labour supply in California to determine their relationship. The intensification of federal immigration enforcement can be measured by analysing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrest data, changes in ICE agent presence, funding for ICE provided through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), significant changes in hiring patterns for enforcement positions within ICE, and the development and implementation of policy.

Initially, to assess the relationship between intensified immigration enforcement and labour supply in California's agricultural industry, I planned to conduct a statistical analysis of ICE arrest data across ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations' three areas of responsibility (AOR) in California, against data produced by the USDA on labour shortages in California. An AOR is the geographic area which each of ICE's 24 field offices is responsible for operating within (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024). This methodology presented a host of challenges that impeded the accuracy of

the results. The first was that labour supply data in California is difficult to measure quantitatively; therefore, the data required to draw definitive conclusions lacked specificity. Many of California's agricultural workers are undocumented immigrants, making it difficult to identify legitimate job vacancies that remain unfilled, as they are not often advertised. An alternative measure of labour supply, however, could be changes in average hours worked in California's agricultural industry. However, identifying the causes of the barriers that lead to reduced hours worked is equally challenging and may not be solely attributable to intensified immigration enforcement.

The immigration arrest and detention data compiled by ICE remain a key measure of the intensification of immigration enforcement relevant to the paper. As such, using the University of California (Los Angeles)'s Deportation Data Project (2026), I was able to export raw data compiled by ICE documenting ICE arrests and detentions. I filtered the data to restrict results to the AORs in California, namely San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego, and used pivot tables to visualise and analyse the data. However, the ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) area of responsibility for San Francisco's includes Hawaii and Guam (Figure 1). As such, relying on ICE arrest data within these AORs as a measure of enforcement intensification may not accurately reflect California's immigration landscape due to contamination from data from Hawaii and Guam (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024). Whilst the insights derived from the data are significant, they are strengthened by other measures of interior immigration intensification in the findings, including policy changes and funding.




Figure 1: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Offices map detailing Areas of Responsibility to the relevant field offices (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2024).

To address the challenges of measuring labour demand and supply, I conducted a systematic literature review (SLR) to examine the correlation between intensified immigration enforcement and labour supply. SLRs are effective in social science research for synthesising large volumes of pre-existing data in diverse formats (Petticrew & Roberts, 2006, p. 2). Migration studies encompass both quantitative and qualitative data, making an SLR an effective approach for analysis; however, it must be conducted in a way that recognises its context-sensitive nature (Sommerfelt et al., 2025, p. 2). To conduct this SLR, I used a range of search terms, including “immigration labour shortage agriculture California”, “immigration enforcement”, “California agriculture labour shortage”, and “deportations and labour shortages”, to build a literature database and identify relevant scholarly terms. I searched Google Scholar, Findit@Flinders, JSTOR, and ProQuest to locate high-quality peer-reviewed articles, then restricted the search to articles published between 2018 and 2026. However, to ensure a contextualised understanding of the findings, scholarly articles outside the time frame were used to position the research politically and socially in the paper's introduction and to assess whether past trends of intensification in immigration enforcement were associated with similar changes in labour supply that could further support the findings.

Given the complex nature of the policies under examination, it was also important to consult congressional resources produced specifically to aid understanding of United States policy and legislation. The Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service (CRS) produces guides to key policy issues summarising the peer-reviewed literature already existing in the area. The CRS analysed the effects of two prominent immigration enforcement policies (287(g) and the Secure Communities programs) on the labour market, providing a starting point for sourcing in my literature review (Handweker, 2026). Although existing literature does not explicitly examine the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on California's agricultural labour supply, correlations have been suggested in relation to specific immigration policies, labour supply for specialised crops, or nationwide studies. These studies fail to encapsulate California's specific challenges but suggest an early hypothesis: that the intensification of immigration enforcement contributes to labour shortages across the agricultural sector.

Findings

Intensification of Immigration Enforcement

Recent years have seen a marked intensification of immigration enforcement at the federal level, including the hiring of 10,000 new ICE officers, the expansion of 287(g) partnerships, and the revocation of federal funding for "sanctuary" jurisdictions (Capps et al., 2018, p. 19; Trump, 2017, pp. 8800–8801). In California, the effect of these federal actions is reflected in various key indicators: increased funding for immigration agencies, expanded police powers through the 287(g) program, greater interagency information sharing through Secure Communities, and observable changes in ICE arrest and deportation data. This evidence of intensified immigration enforcement in California provides a basis for investigation into its consequences for the labour supply in California's agricultural sector.

Increase in Immigration-Related Arrests/Deportations

Arrests and deportations of immigrants in the United States have risen sharply since 2017, when President Donald Trump took office. This provides the most significant indicator of intensified interior immigration enforcement (Capps et al., 2018, p. 7). ICE has not published arrest, detention and removal data prior to 2022, so filtering the raw data by Areas of Responsibility within California (Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego) to analyse changes from the Obama Administration to Trump's first term is not possible. However, nationally, immigration-related arrests increased by 43 per cent, from an average of 304 daily arrests before his inauguration to 435 throughout Trump's

first term (East et al., 2026, pp. 2). In his second term, this figure rose by 170%, to 821 daily arrests by ICE (East et al., 2026, pp. 2-3).

Figure 2 shows an abrupt increase in California's weekly arrests from 202 to 603 after his inauguration on 20 January 2025, demonstrating a significant intensification of immigration enforcement throughout the State (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, compiled by The Deportation Project, 2026).




Figure 2: Graph produced from the Deportation Project's data visualisation tool, based on data provided by ICE, showing the number of ICE arrests per week from 2022 to present, with Trump's second inauguration date (20th plotted for comparison (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, compiled by The Deportation Data Project, 2026).

Further, the number of stays in California detention centres has also increased since President Trump's second term commenced, as indicated in Figure 3 (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, compiled by The Deportation Data Project, 2026). California holds the third-highest number of immigrant detainees in the United States, averaging 3,800 detainees per day (Lacarte, 2025). Local Californian news agencies have also reported an increase in the number of detention centres operating in California, resulting from higher detention numbers, with 2 additional centres opening since Trump's second term, bringing the total from 6 to 8 ICE detention centres (Fry, 2026). These increases in arrests, detentions, and facilities have been made possible by substantial increases in funding for immigration enforcement operations.




Figure 3: Graph showing the number of detentions per month at California Detention Centres from 2023 to Feb 2026, with the red plot marking President Trump's inauguration for his second term (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, compiled by The Deportation Data Project, 2026).

Increases in Funding

The significant increase in ICE activity, facilities, and resources requires considerable funding and demonstrates that the intensification involved not only increased funding but also expanded federal capacity to undertake immigration enforcement in regions heavily dependent on immigrant agricultural labour. ICE receives funding through a combination of appropriations to DHS, decided by Congress annually, as well as immigration fee accounts, and supplementary funding bills passed urgently for immediate needs (By the Numbers, 2026). Following the 9/11 attacks, funding for immigration enforcement has steadily increased throughout the Administrations up until President Obama's second term in 2012 (Capps et al., 2018, p. 12). More recently, since 2020, DHS funding has increased only slightly; however, the amount apportioned to ICE and supplementary funding increased dramatically in 2025, when President Trump commenced his second term (Figure 4). Trump's One Big Beautiful Act committed more than $170 billion to ICE over a four-year period, more than the annual budgets of local and state law enforcement across the United States combined (O'Herron, 2025). Further, following the passage of the Secure America Act (Senate Bill 2) as part of the DHS Appropriations bill in June 2026, ICE was allocated an additional $38 billion (of $70 billion provided to DHS) (Painter, 2026; Lindsey, 2025). Of this funding, ICE has apportioned $45 billion specifically to increase the capacity of detention centres to operate more than 135,000 detention beds until July 2029 (Reichlin-Melnick, 2026). Hours before the vote on Senate Bill 2, Republicans added a provision that provided $350 million for ICE operations in states that do not have information-sharing agreements with ICE or are sanctuary jurisdictions (Altman & D'Avanzo, 2026). Additional funding for detention beds, personnel and enforcement activities enables a greater volume of arrests and removals, increasing the probability that undocumented agricultural workers are detained or discouraged from participating in the labour market. Consequently, funding

serves as an important indicator of the intensification of enforcement and its effects on labour supply.




Figure 4: Graph demonstrating funding for ICE and DHS from 2020 to 2027 by compiling public data, reports, budgets, RSS feeds, and legislation (ICEMap, 2026).

Immigration Policy Changes

Immigration policy in the United States has consistently fluctuated with the Administration in power and the values of the elected party (Baxter & Nowrasteh, 2021, p. 2). Immigration policy significantly affects enforcement, with local law enforcement's response to federal policies vital to the overall effectiveness of immigration enforcement (Ciancio, 2017, p. 7). As such, immigration policy acts as a measure of the intensity of immigration enforcement at the time by elucidating the Administration's priorities. Since 2017, changes to two key immigration policies, the 278(g) and Secure

Communities programs, have illustrated the intensification of immigration enforcement in California (Figure 5).

Expansion of the 287(g) Program

Section 287(g) of the United States' Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorises the delegation of ICE agents' powers (including, but not limited to, the investigation, arrest, and detention of immigrants) to state and local law enforcement officials (Handweker, 2026). To participate in the Section 287(g) program, local law enforcement agencies (LEAs)




Figure 5: Timeline showing policy changes in interior immigration enforcement from 1996 to February 2018 (Capps et al., 2018, p. 23).

must enter into an agreement under the INA that enables training of local officers to perform ICE agent functions (Kolker, 2025). Although the program was codified in 1996

under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the first agreement did not take place until 2002 due to national security concerns following the 9/11 terrorist attack (Kolker, 2025). The number of agreements increased to 72 in 2011 before declining to just 35 under the Obama Administration, narrowing the scope of ICE agents, while allowing for "prosecutorial discretion" for agents and delegates to prioritise arrests, detentions, and deportations based on criminal convictions (Capps et al., 2018, p. 16). In January 2017, President Trump overturned Obama's prosecutorial discretion policy and signed two executive orders (13767 and 13768) encouraging the expansion of the 287(g) program, taking the number of agreements from 35 to 150, a 300% increase (Kolker, 2025). As of July 17, 2026, ICE reports that there are 2,126 287(g) agreements in effect, with 1,130 of them signed in 2025 (Diaz & Jin, 2026; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2026). The expansion of the 287(g) programs evidences the intensification of immigration enforcement through increased LEA cooperation with ICE.

Before President Trump's first term, California passed the Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools Act (TRUST Act) in 2013 to limit the State's LEAs cooperation with ICE (Capps et al., 2018, p. 17). The TRUST Act was not considered sufficient to prevent LEA cooperation with ICE, so California's Governor, in October 2017, signed into effect the California Values Act (SB 54) prohibiting LEAs within the State from entering into 287(g) agreements from January 1, 2018 (Capps et al., 2018, pp. 21–22). As such, there are no longer any active 287(g) agreements in California, making it a sanctuary jurisdiction with its law enforcement restricted from assisting federal immigration officers (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 13; Schultz, 2020). However, this does not mean the program's expansion contradicts intensified immigration enforcement in the state. Rather, because the 287(g) program is ineffective in California, ICE has been forced to expand its own activities by deploying additional agents to the state rather than relying on LEAs. The intention to intensify immigration enforcement in California was further demonstrated when the Trump Administration sued California over the passage of SB 54, which the District Court held constitutional and the Administration's appeal was rejected (ICE Out of California, 2023). President Trump then attempted to penalise sanctuary states and cities by withholding crucial funding, a move that courts have also ruled unconstitutional as a breach of the Tenth Amendment (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 13). Although Section 287(g) is not in effect in California, the Trump Administration's actions to compel LEA cooperation with ICE within the State demonstrate an intensification of immigration enforcement in California.

Secure Communities

The Secure Communities Program (SC), first introduced by ICE in 2008, aimed to expand information sharing between law enforcement and ICE by requiring, through federal legislation, LEAs to report personal information of arrested citizens in their jurisdiction to DHS immigration databases to aid their investigations of illegal immigrants (Nunez et al., 2026; East, 2024). SC was enacted throughout all U.S. jurisdictions in January 2013, but it was halted in November 2014 and remained inactive until President Trump reinstated it merely five days after his inauguration in 2017 (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2025). ICE claims that since its reintroduction, the program has enabled the deportation of over 43,000 "convicted criminal aliens" (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2025). Although California's sanctuary laws (the TRUST and California Values Acts) restrict LEAs cooperation with ICE, it's important to make the distinction that they cannot prevent ICE from enforcing federal legislation in the State (Woolery, 2025). Through SC, fingerprints collected during arrests by California LEAs are automatically uploaded to the FBI database, which ICE can access. Although sanctuary laws cannot prevent this, they prohibit the sharing of release dates and times for detainees that ICE requests via SC (Woolery, 2025). Further restrictions under California's sanctuary laws prevent direct jail-to-detention transfers and require ICE to conduct independent investigations (Woolery, 2025). Although the impact of SC is limited by the California Value and TRUST Acts, the reimplementation of SC signals a policy shift toward intensified interior immigration enforcement.

Consequences on Agricultural Labour Shortages in California

The California Farmer Immigration Enforcement Survey found that approximately 15% of the State's farmers experienced reduced access to labour due to increased immigration enforcement between late 2025 and early 2026 (Rutledge & Win, 2026, p. 2). Over 60% of California's agricultural workers are immigrants, and over 25% are undocumented (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 24). Undocumented immigrants are predominantly of working age, with 65% aged 25 to 54, compared with 51% of the overall immigrant population and only 37% of native-born residents (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 18). As such, over 1.5 million undocumented immigrants are in California's labour force, making up 8% of the state's workforce, supporting reports that significant reductions in the State's immigrant population would consequently reduce its workforce supply (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 18). The documented loss of employees due to immigration enforcement in California has an even greater impact on labour-intensive crop farmers, who produce specialty crops which drive the industry's economic success in California (Rutledge & Win, 2026, p. 3; Rutledge and Taylor, 2019). By analysing the U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service's data, Li (2025) projects a 20 to 40% reduction in

California's agricultural workforce, equivalent to an economic loss of $3 to 7 billion due to ICE raids in the State. With an increasing body of literature crediting the California farm labour shortages to intensified immigration enforcement, it is equally necessary to examine how this relationship manifests.

Detention and Deportation of the Workforce

Given the significant proportion of immigrants in California's agricultural workforce, a substantial increase in detentions and deportations naturally reduces the labourers available to farmers. Detentions across the U.S. have increased by 75% in one year, leading to a 2,450% increase in the number of immigrants with no criminal record detained by ICE on any given day (Reichlin-Melnick, 2026). Further, the number of ICE facilities housing detainees has increased by 91% between January and November 2025 alone (Reichlin-Melnick, 2026). In Southern California, ICE detentions rose from 699 in May 2025 to nearly 2,000 by June 2025 (Li, 2025). Deportations also increased from 45,000 between January and September 2016 to 61,000 during the same period in 2017, representing a 37% increase in the first year of Trump's first term alone (Capps et al., 2018, p. 7). Across the United States, increases in immigration-related detentions were associated with a 23% decrease in weekly hours worked by farm labourers (Gutiérrez-Li & Rubalcaba, 2025, p. 1). The significant share of immigrants in the workforce, as well as the volume of detentions and deportations, is well documented, indicating that the rapid increase in immigration detentions and deportations is displacing a significant portion of California's farm workforce, contributing to labour shortages in California.

ICE Deterring the Imported Workforce

ICE activities are continuing to reduce the agricultural workforce in California by deterring the importation of labour into the industry and discouraging work in the United States altogether. After all, when California's workforce is significantly reduced due to detention and deportations, farmers try to fill these labour-intensive positions, but native-born workers (regardless of financial enticement) are unwilling to do so, forcing farmers to rely on the imported workforce (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 15; M. Clemens, 2013, p. 22; Ifft & Jodlowski, 2022, p. 2). However, racism and discrimination toward immigrant agricultural workers and their families in California has significantly increased since 2018 due to the Trump Administration's anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric, attributing criminal conduct and anti-social behaviour to Mexican immigrants specifically (Medel-Herrero et al., 2021, p. 641). Further, analysis of American Community Survey data between 2005-2017 revealed a 15% increase in self-employment among Mexican immigrants, linked to intensified immigration enforcement (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2021, p. 1). They argue that Mexican immigrants are shifting to

self-employment to provide themselves with better working environments due to immigration-related scrutiny as well as racial discrimination (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2021, p. 1). Its attribution to increased interior immigration enforcement, evident since 2018, supports the assumption that this figure is likely still true, if not increasing. Business ownership among Mexican immigrants as of 2018 was equal to that of non-Hispanics, suggesting a substantial shift away from farm labour work due to interior immigration enforcement (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2021, p. 1; Medel-Herrero et al., 2021, p. 641). Although indirect, stricter immigration enforcement discourages immigrant workers in California by strengthening reliance on imported labour through mass detention and deportation. It also heightens discrimination against Mexican workers, fuelled by Trump's framing of criminality, which decreases the available imported workforce as evidenced by a rise in Mexican immigrant self-employment.

Public Fear

In addition to increased detention, deportation and discrimination, intensified immigration enforcement has contributed to California's agricultural labour shortages, perhaps most significantly through the public's fear of ICE agents. In the Immigration Enforcement Survey, California farmers reported that approximately 12% of workers, specifically on labour-intensive crop farms, experienced anxiety and fear due to immigration enforcement (Rutledge and Win, 2026, p. 3). Furthermore, heightened worker anxiety and dread have led 7% of Californian farmers to be concerned about future labour losses, with labour-intensive crop producers being the most affected, with 33% reporting negative consequences such as worker fear or labour losses (Rutledge and Win, 2026, p. 4). Although this study doesn't articulate how heightened fear of immigration enforcement translates into labour loss, Gutiérrez-Li and Rubalcaba (2025, p. 476) state that fear of "immigration-related scrutiny" causes workers to temporarily leave their positions. Handweker (2026) also stipulates that due to fear, immigrant workers are reluctant to go to and from work, as regular traffic stops by law enforcement may lead to deportation. Further, with California's defiance of the 287(g) program, ICE has targeted specific counties within the State that have large immigrant populations working in the agricultural sector, inciting fear of going to and from work (Adan et al., 2025). For example, the January 2025 Kern County raids, which lasted three days, had dramatic effects throughout the San Joaquin Valley, with residents avoiding their daily activities for fear of encountering ICE agents (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 43; Adan et al., 2025). Whilst the fear and anxiety experienced by immigrant workers in relation to immigration enforcement suggest a noteworthy contribution to California's agricultural labour shortages, the reasons why ICE prompts fear, beyond just deportation, need to be further analysed to assess the strength of its correlation with labour shortages.

Discussion

The literature identified three principal mechanisms that explain how the intensification of immigration enforcement has led to shortages of agricultural labour in California: the removal of workers through detention and deportation, the deterrence of prospective workers, and the incitement of fear. Fear is identified as the most significant indirect mechanism contributing to California's agricultural labour shortages, as it is a behavioural response among immigrant workers to the direct mechanism of detention and deportation, whereas deterrence of the workforce is an indirect labour effect stemming from fear. Although public concern towards immigration enforcement agencies is not a recent phenomenon, the extent to which this anxiety is heightened by current technological developments remains insufficiently studied. As such, the discussion also explores whether labour shortages are primarily attributable to the intensification of immigration enforcement itself, to the increased prominence of enforcement activities, or to a combination of both.

Detention and deportation are direct mechanisms that reduce the labour supply by physically removing immigrant agricultural workers (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 24). The literature shows a strong correlation between labour shortages, the significant share of immigrants in the workforce, and the volume of detentions and deportations; however, it does not explicitly identify the detention and deportation of immigrants as a direct cause of a reduction in California's agricultural workforce (Ryo, 2019, p. 107). Although detention and deportation data provide the strongest evidence that intensified immigration enforcement has reduced California's agricultural labour supply, because the number of detained workers remains substantially smaller than the overall undocumented workforce, this mechanism alone is unlikely to explain the full extent of reported labour shortages.

While detention and deportation eliminate current workers, deterrence decreases the future availability of agricultural labour by discouraging migrants from entering or staying in the industry. Anti-immigrant political discourse, discrimination, the costs associated with H-2A visas, and the rise of self-employment all detract from the future imported workforce; however, unlike detention, deterrence is significantly more difficult to measure (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2021, p. 1; Medel-Herrero et al., 2021, p. 641). Researchers are unable to observe workers who choose not to immigrate to the United States for work, so the literature relies on indirect indicators such as changes in migration trends, self-employment, and employer surveys. Deterrence relies on a

change of behaviour in response to intensified immigration enforcement, which is fuelled by fear of detention and deportation. If the risk of such is so high, why would an immigrant choose to live a life in fear by working in agriculture in California?

Fear is an indirect mechanism allowing intensified immigration enforcement to contribute to agricultural labour shortages in California. Unlike detention and deterrence, fear does not require direct contact with immigration authorities to influence labour supply; instead, it affects workers' behaviour before enforcement measures are implemented. The sudden intensification of immigration enforcement incites fear through increased raids, arrests, deportations, detentions, and the visible presence of immigration authorities (Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 2025, p. 43; Adan et al., 2025). This effect is compounded by a rise in violent immigration-related arrests and the subsequent politicisation of these incidents, which contributes to the spread of racial discrimination. President Trump has repeatedly employed “worst of the worst” rhetoric to justify the intensification of immigration enforcement, asserting that immigrants are “bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists” (P. Ong et al., 2026, p. 1). In January 2026, ICE agents fatally shot two American citizens: Renee Good, a mother of three, and Alex Pretti, an intensive care nurse (Biesecker & Mustian, 2026; Biesecker et al., 2026). In response to public backlash after the shootings, President Trump defended ICE, stating that agents are “apprehending murderers, and drug dealers, and lots of bad people… Do you want to live with these people?” (P. Ong et al., 2026, p. 1). Handweker (2026) and Rutledge & Win (2026) state that both workers and the public in California are avoiding travel to work, grocery shopping, or seeking healthcare out of fear of ICE action. It is necessary to consider whether this fear is attributable solely to intensified immigration enforcement or to the heightened visibility of these actions in the contemporary media environment.

Highly publicised enforcement incidents demonstrate how modern media may amplify the behavioural consequences of intensified immigration enforcement beyond those directly affected. For example, recordings of the confronting Minnesota shootings of Renee Good and Alex Pretti were published on social media and subsequently broadcast by news outlets (Pengelly et al., 2026). The footage of these incidents allowed the public to form their own opinions of whether the ICE agent’s response (the fatal shootings) was proportionate to the perceived threat. Thousands of Americans protested, gathered at the vigils for Good and Pretti, and expressed their horror over the incidents and fear of ICE agents who were responsible for these deaths (Human Rights Watch, 2026). Social media algorithms promote content that receives high engagement, including violent or criminal incidents, which amplifies the fear response to events involving ICE (Segura & Pérez, 2025). However, it may overexpose violent events that

distort the public's perception of security and safety, meaning that the amplification of Good and Pretti's shooting may incite fear of ICE disproportionate to their occurrences (Segura & Pérez, 2025). It's important to note that fear generated from these incidents occurs as a direct result of immigration enforcement intensification, and without it, the media would have nothing to amplify. As such, public fear stems from both the intensification of immigration enforcement and contemporary media, which magnify it.

As such, fear is the broadest mechanism linking intensified immigration enforcement to labour shortages. While detention removes individual workers, fear can affect thousands of undocumented workers simultaneously, including those who have never encountered ICE. Contemporary media technologies amplify this behavioural response by circulating violent footage of enforcement operations, consequently extending the effects of local enforcement across wider immigrant communities.

Alternative Contributing Factors

COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic is an important alternative contributor to California agricultural labour shortages. The first confirmed coronavirus case was detected in the United States in January 2020, and stay-at-home, social distancing, and border-closure measures for international travel were implemented by April of the same year to prevent the spread (Luckstead et al., 2020, p. 382). Given the value of international workers to agricultural production, industry leaders were most concerned about securing a sufficient labour supply amid considerable travel limitations (Weersink et al., 2021, pp. 11-12). In recognition of the necessity of foreign-born workers to the United States' food supply chain, ICE temporarily shifted enforcement operations to focus on undocumented migrants with criminal charges and reduced barriers to processing H-2A visas (Luckstead et al., 2020, p. 385). As such, COVID-19 alone cannot comprehensively account for California's labour shortages. Many pandemic restrictions had eased by 2022, whereas immigration enforcement intensified substantially following President Trump's second inauguration in 2025, with increased arrests, funding, and detention capacity. The timing of increased enforcement activity in relation to reported labour shortages indicates that immigration enforcement had an ongoing effect independent of the pandemic's impact.

California Droughts

From 2020, California experienced a three-year drought, with precipitation at only 68% of the 20th-century average, resulting in significant economic consequences (Medellín-

Azuara et al., 2022, p. 25). Drought in California reduces irrigation for crops, leading to lower yields and production, with an estimated revenue loss of $1.7 billion across the State between 2022 and 2019 (Medellín-Azuara et al., 2022, pp. 14-15). Most articles detailing the effects of these droughts focus on economic impacts rather than labour supply issues; however, research suggests that droughts that place agricultural producers in financial hardship will lead to reduced costs, most quickly achieved through workforce reductions (Greene, 2018). Unlike immigration enforcement, however, drought primarily reduces the demand for agricultural labour by limiting production rather than reducing the available workforce itself. Furthermore, California's highest-value specialty crops, such as almonds, pistachios and grapes, continue to require labour-intensive harvesting even during periods of reduced water availability (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2024). Consequently, while drought undoubtedly contributes toward fluctuations in agricultural employment, it does not fully account for farmers' reports that workers were unwilling or unable to attend work due to immigration enforcement.

While these factors contributed to labour shortages, none directly explains the simultaneous increases in worker fear and reductions in hours worked, nor the farmer reports that followed intensified immigration enforcement. As such, intensified immigration enforcement remains a substantial contributor to California’s agricultural labour shortages, alongside the effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic and California droughts.

Conclusion

This paper examined how the intensification of federal immigration enforcement since 2018 has affected labour supply in California's agricultural industry. The findings indicate that immigration enforcement has intensified considerably through expanded detention and deportation practices, increased funding, and broader enforcement powers under policies including Section 287(g) and the reinstated Secure Communities program. Although California's sanctuary legislation limits aspects of state-level cooperation with federal enforcement, they have not prevented ICE from expanding its presence within the State. The evidence suggests that intensified immigration enforcement has contributed considerably to labour shortages within California's labour-intensive agricultural sector through three mechanisms. First, detention and deportation directly reduce the available agricultural workforce by removing workers from an industry that already relies heavily on immigrant labour. Secondly, intensified enforcement deters future migrant workers from entering or remaining in agricultural employment, reducing the industry's capacity to replace lost workers. Finally, fear

generated by visible enforcement activities appears to affect a much larger proportion of the workforce than those directly detained. Given the challenges in establishing that the intensification of immigration enforcement is the sole cause of agricultural labour shortages, this paper focused on demonstrating how it contributes to these shortages alongside other factors, including the State's droughts and the prolonged effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Overall, this research adds to a growing body of literature by showing that intensified immigration enforcement contributes to California's agricultural labour shortages through the interconnected mechanisms of detention and deportation, deterrence and fear. In doing so, it highlights the need for decision-makers to consider the wider labour market consequences of immigration enforcement and for additional research to quantify the relative impact of each mechanism on workforce availability in California's agricultural sector.

Bibliography

Adan, M., Shakya, T., Kipreos, C. B., Riegle, A., & Keane, S. (2025). Migrant farm workers go on high alert amid immigration raids. In *ABC News*. https://abcnews.com/US/migrant-farm-workers-high-alert-amid-immigration-raids/story?id=118434172

Alsan, M., & Yang, C. S. (2022). Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities [Review of *Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities*]. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, *106*(6), 1–45. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01250

Altman, H., & D'Avanzo, B. (2026, June 11). *What's in Congress's New ICE Funding Law?* [Review of *What's in Congress's New ICE Funding Law?*]. NILC. https://www.nilc.org/articles/whats-in-congresss-new-ice-funding-law/

Amuedo-Dorantes, C., Lofstrom, M., & Wang, C. (2021). Immigration Policy and the Rise of Self-Employment among Mexican Immigrants. *ILR Review*, *75*(5), 001979392110577. https://doi.org/10.1177/00197939211057765

Aziz, S. (2021). Reflections on Security, Race, and Rights Twenty Years After 9/11. *Journal of National Security LAW & Policy*, *12*(135), 135–152. academia.edu. https://www.academia.edu/download/72693087/JNSLP_Reflections_on_Security_Race_and_Rights_Aziz_2021_.pdf

Baxter, A. M., & Nowrasteh, A. (2021, August 3). *A Brief History of U.S. Immigration Policy from the Colonial Period to the Present Day*. Jstor. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33757

Bay Area Council Economic Institute. (2025). *The Economic Impact of Mass Deportation in California*. https://www.bayareaeconomy.org/files/pdf/EconomicImpactOfMassDeportation-June2025.pdf

Biesecker, M., & Mustian, J. (2026). Renee Nicole Good: Woman shot by ICE agent was a mom of 3. In *AP News*. https://apnews.com/article/ice-shooting-minneapolis-minnesota-9aa822670b705c89906f2c699f1d16c5

Biesecker, M., Santana, R., & Richer, A. D. (2026). DOJ opens federal civil rights probe into death of Alex Pretti. In *AP News*. https://apnews.com/article/minneapolis-ice-fbi-alex-pretti-immigration-65a963816603a08bbc9db83961dd173f

By the Numbers. (2026). *How does ICE spend its budget? And who profits?* [Review of *How does ICE spend its budget? And who profits?*]. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/video/by-the-numbers-3/2026/1/31/how-does-ice-spend-its-budget-and-who-profits

Campani, G., Fabelo Concepción, S., Rodriguez Soler, A., & Sánchez Savín, C. (2022). The Rise of Donald Trump Right-Wing Populism in the United States: Middle American Radicalism and Anti-Immigration Discourse. *Societies*, *12*(6), 154. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc12060154

Capps, R., Chishti, M., Gelatt, J., Bolter, J., & Soto, A. (2018). *Revving up the Deportation Machinery - Enforcement and Pushback under Trump* [Review of *Revving up the Deportation Machinery - Enforcement and Pushback under Trump*]. https://iptp-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/2018.05_Revving_up_the_Deportation_Machinery_Enforcement_and_Pushback_under_Trump.pdf

Casellas, J. P., & Wallace, S. J. (2018). Sanctuary Cities: Public Attitudes Toward Enforcement Collaboration Between Local Police and Federal Immigration Authorities. *Urban Affairs Review*, *56*(32–64), 107808741877611. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087418776115

Champlin, C. D. (2026, January 28). *Agriculture, natural resources sectors support California's rank as world's fourth-largest economy | ANR News Releases*. UC Agriculture and Natural Resources. https://ucanr.edu/blog/anr-news-releases/article/working-landscapes-report

Ciancio, A. (2017). *The Impact of Immigration Policies on Local Enforcement, Crime and Policing Efficiency - ProQuest* [Review of *The Impact of Immigration Policies on Local Enforcement, Crime and Policing Efficiency - ProQuest*]. Proquest.Com. https://www.proquest.com/openview/edda4078c4028b3fd1a84206a7ee184e/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750

Clemens, M. (2013). The Effect of Foreign Labor on Native Employment: A Job-Specific Approach and Application to North Carolina Farms - Working Paper 326 [Review of *The Effect of Foreign Labor on Native Employment: A Job-Specific Approach and Application to North Carolina Farms - Working Paper 326*]. In *Center for Global Development | Ideas to Action*. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/effect-foreign-labor-native-employment-job-specific-approach-and-application-north

Clemens, M. A. (2022). The effect of seasonal work visas on native employment: Evidence from US farm work in the Great Recession [Review of *The effect of seasonal work visas on native employment: Evidence from US farm work in the Great Recession*]. *Review of International Economics*, *30*(5), 1348–1374. https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12603

Costa, D. (2022). Hearing before the United States House Committee on Education and Labor Subcommittee on Workforce Protections - Second Class Workers: Assessing H2 Visa Programs Impact on Workers. In *EPI*. Economic Policy Institute.

https://files.epi.org/uploads/Costa-EPI-testimony-House-hearing-on-H-2-18-July-2022.pdf

Devadoss, S., & Luckstead, J. (2018). US immigration policies and dynamics of cross-border workforce in agriculture. *The World Economy*, *41*(9), 2389–2413. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12684

Diaz, J., & Jin, C. H. (2026, February 17). *Little-used ICE agreements with local police have exploded under Trump* [Review of *Little-used ICE agreements with local police have exploded under Trump*]. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2026/02/17/nx-s1-5707449/local-police-immigration-cooperation-287g

East, C. (2024, September 18). *The labor market impact of deportations*. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-labor-market-impact-of-deportations/

East, C., Patler, C., & Cox, E. (2026). ICE Arrests across Trump's First and Second Terms: Variation in Targeting, Method, and Geography [Review of *ICE Arrests across Trump's First and Second Terms: Variation in Targeting, Method, and Geography*]. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers*, *34794*. https://doi.org/10.3386/w34794

Fry, W. (2026, April 23). *ICE quietly opens another detention center in a former California prison*. CalMatters. https://calmatters.org/justice/2026/04/new-ice-detention-center-mcfarland/

Greene, C. (2018). Broadening understandings of drought – the climate vulnerability of farmworkers and rural communities in california (USA). *Environmental Science & Policy*, *89*(1), 283–291. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2018.08.002

Gutiérrez-Li, A., & Rubalcaba, J. A. A. (2025). The effects of ongoing internal immigration enforcement on the US agricultural labor supply. *Journal of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association*, *4*(1). https://doi.org/10.1002/jaa2.70026

Hadzhidimova, L. (2023). Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In S. N. Romaniuk, M. S. Catino, & C. A. Martin (Eds.), *The Handbook of Homeland Security*. CRC Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315144511

Handweker, E. W. (2026). *Measuring the Impact of Immigration Enforcement on Labor Markets: Quasi-Experimental Studies of §287(g) Agreements and the Secure Communities Program* [Review of *Measuring the Impact of Immigration Enforcement on Labor Markets: Quasi-Experimental Studies of §287(g) Agreements and the Secure Communities Program*]. Congress.Gov. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/if13188

Hines, A. L., & Peri, G. (2020, January 8). *Immigrants" Deportations, Local Crime, and Police Effectiveness*. Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/publications/research-briefs-economic-policy/immigrants-deportations-local-crime-police

Hooks, G., & Lengefeld, M. (2022). Callous Cruelty and Blow Back: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Facilities, Riskscapes, and Community Transmission of COVID-19. *Environmental Justice*, *15*(1), 39–57. https://doi.org/10.1089/env.2021.0040

Human Rights Watch. (2026). US: Minneapolis Killing by ICE Unjustified [Review of *US: Minneapolis Killing by ICE Unjustified*]. In *Human Rights Watch*. https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/01/09/us-minneapolis-killing-by-ice-unjustified

ICE Out of California. (2023). *California Values Act (SB 54)* [Review of *California Values Act (SB 54)*]. ICE Out of California. https://www.iceoutofca.org/values.html

ICEMap. (2026). *ICE Funding* [Review of *ICE Funding*]. ICEMap. https://icemap.org/ice/funding.html

Ifft, J., & Jodlowski, M. (2022). Is ICE freezing US agriculture? Farm-level adjustment to increased local immigration enforcement. *Labour Economics*, *78*(1), 102203. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2022.102203

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2019, February 1). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism*. Cambridge Core. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cultural-backlash/3C7CB32722C7BB8B19A0FC005CAFD02B

JBS International, Inc. (2022). *California Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) 2015-2019: A Demographic and Employment Profile of California Farmworkers*. https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS%20Research%20Report%2015.pdf

Jim Costa - About. (2012, December 11). Congressman Jim Costa. https://costa.house.gov/about/full-biography

Johnson, T. C., & Hunter, R. D. (2016a). Changes in homeland security activities since 9/11: an examination of state and local law enforcement agencies' practices. *Police Practice and Research*, *18*(2), 160–173. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2016.1261253

Johnson, T. C., & Hunter, R. D. (2016b). Changes in homeland security activities since 9/11: an examination of state and local law enforcement agencies' practices. *Police Practice and Research*, *18*(2), 160–173. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2016.1261253

Kolker, A. F. (2025). *The 287(g) Program: State and Local Immigration Enforcement* [Review of *The 287(g) Program: State and Local Immigration Enforcement*]. Congress.Gov. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11898

Kostandini, G., Mykerezi, E., & Escalante, C. (2014). The Impact of Immigration Enforcement on the U.S. Farming Sector. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, *96*(1), 172–192. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24477062

Lacarte, V. (2025, October 23). *U.S. Immigrant Detention Grows to Record Heights under Trump Administration*. Migrationpolicy.Org. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trump-immigrant-detention

Li, X. (2025). *Quantifying the Economic Impact of 2025 ICE Raids on California's Agricultural Industry: A Case Study of Oxnard* [Review of *Quantifying the Economic Impact of 2025 ICE Raids on California's Agricultural Industry: A Case Study of Oxnard*]. Arxiv.Org. https://arxiv.org/html/2508.03787v1

Lindsey, G. (2025). *Text - S.2 - 119th Congress (2025-2026): Secure America Act*. Congress.Gov. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/2/text

Luckstead, J., Nayga, R. M., & Snell, H. A. (2020). Labor issues in the food supply chain amid the covid-19 pandemic. *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy*, *43*(1). https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.13090

Medel-Herrero, A., Deeb-Sossa, N., Torreiro-Casal, M., Shumway, M., Hovey, J., & Sokas, R. (2023). Documenting working experiences of agricultural workers in California. *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, *29*(2), 15–34. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.48416/ijsaf.v29i2.525

Medel-Herrero, A., Torreiro-Casal, M., Hovey, J. D, Rascon-Garcia, K., Smiley-Jewell, S., Shumway, M., & Deeb-Sossa, N. (2021). The increasing toll of racism and discrimination on California agricultural workers and their families under the Trump administration. *Ethnicities*, *21*(4), 638–663. https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968211018255

Medellín-Azuara, J., Escriva-Bou, A., Rodríguez-Flores, J. M., Cole, S. A., Abatzoglou, J. T., Viers, J. H., Santos, N., & Sumner, D. A. (2022). *Economic Impacts of the 2020-2022 Drought on California Agriculture: A report for the California Department of Food and Agriculture*. Water Systems Management Lab. https://wsm.ucmerced.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Economic_Impact_CA_Drought_V01.pdf

Mehrad, A., & Hossein, M. (2019). Comparison between Qualitative and Quantitative Research Approaches Social Sciences. *International Journal For Research In Educational Studies* , *5*(7), 01–07. https://www.academia.edu/download/61373947/33Comparison_between_Qualitative_and_Quantitative_Research_Approaches_Social_Sciences20191129-122378-1f2hepc.pdf

Minkoff-Zern, L.-A., Dudley, M. J., Zoodsma, A., Walia, B., & Welsh, R. (2022). Protracted dependence and unstable relations: Agrarian questions in the H-2A visa program1. *Journal of Rural Studies*, *93*(1), 43–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2022.05.006

Montange, L. (2022). Political Detentions, Political Deportations: Repressive Immigration Enforcement in Times of Trump. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *40*(2), 332–350. https://doi.org/10.1177/02637758211056342

Nagel, C. (2019). Populism, immigration and the Trump phenomenon in the U.S. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, *37*(1), 12–16.

Nunez, C. D. V., Bhatt, S., Seif, B. F., Mendoza, F. S., Laitin, D. D., & Asad, A. L. (2026). Reconsideration of Secure Communities rollout reveals preemptive local-federal cooperation in immigration enforcement. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, *123*(15). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2510928123

Office of the Law Revision Counsel. (2025). *8 U.S. Code § 1226*. LII / Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1226

O'Herron, M. (2025, July 8). *Big Budget Act Creates a "Deportation-Industrial Complex"*. Brennan Center for Justice. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/big-budget-act-creates-deportation-industrial-complex

Ong, J., Ong, P., Diaz, S., & Chinchilla, M. (2025). *Latino Ice Arrests Surge Under Trump*. Unseen and UCLA Center for Neighborhood Knowledge.

Ong, P., Ong, J., & Pech, C. (2026). The "Worst of the Worst" Pretext: ICE Arrest Patterns Under Trump [Review of *The "Worst of the Worst" Pretext: ICE Arrest Patterns Under Trump*]. *UCLA Centre for Neighbourhood Knowledge*. https://knowledge.luskin.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/UCLA_CNK_Worst_of_the_Worst_ICE_Arrest_Patterns_Under_Trump_May2026.pdf

Painter, W. L. (2026). *Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2026 State of Play* [Review of *Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2026 State of Play*]. Congress.Gov. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48874

Pengelly, E., Brown, P., & Garman, B. (2026, January 26). Unpicking the second Minneapolis shooting frame by frame [Review of *Unpicking the second Minneapolis shooting frame by frame*]. *BBC*. https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/cg4e0r1el5yo

Peri, G., & Sparber, C. (2009). Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, *1*(3), 135–169. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.1.3.135

Petticrew, M., & Roberts, H. (2006). Why Do We Need Systematic Reviews? In *Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences* (pp. 1–26). Wiley Online Library. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470754887.ch1

Pierce, S., & Bolter, J. (2020, July). *Dismantling and Reconstructing the U.S. Immigration System: A Catalog of Changes under the Trump Presidency* [Review of *Dismantling and*

Reconstructing the U.S. Immigration System: A Catalog of Changes under the Trump Presidency]. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/publication/dismantling-and-reconstructing-us-immigration-system-catalog-changes-under-trump

Pierce, S., & Capps, R. (2017, February). *Trump Executive Order and DHS Guidance on Interior Enforcement: A Brief Review* [Review of *Trump Executive Order and DHS Guidance on Interior Enforcement: A Brief Review*]. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/publication/trump-executive-order-and-dhs-guidance-interior-enforcement-brief-review

Prewitt, K. B. (2026). *Climate suitability and agronomic integration of high-value specialty crops in california: Coffee, olives, and saffron as models for climate-resilient diversification*. Proquest.Com. https://www.proquest.com/openview/dbc13ba04cb61d77c9e431e9b22addbc/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y

Reichlin-Melnick, A. (2026, January 23). *New Report Details ICE's Expanding and Increasingly Unaccountable Detention System - American Immigration Council* [Review of *New Report Details ICE's Expanding and Increasingly Unaccountable Detention System - American Immigration Council*]. American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-expanding-detention-system/

Richards, T. J. (2018). Immigration Reform and Farm Labor Markets. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, *100*(4), 1050–1071. https://doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aay027

Rutledge, Z., & Taylor, J. E. (2019). California farmers change production practices as the farm labor supply declines. *ARE Update*, *22*(6), 5–8. ncaeonline.org. https://www.ncaeonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Rutledge-and-Taylor-2019-Effects-of-Farm-Labor-Scarcity-on-Farming-Practices-in-California.pdf

Rutledge, Z., & Win, M. T. (2026, March 17). *Findings from the California Farmer Immigration Enforcement Survey*. Research Gate. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.21829.10724

Ryo, E. (2019). Understanding Immigration Detention: Causes, Conditions, and Consequences. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, *15*(1), 97–115. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-101518-042743

Schultz, D. (2020, February 15). *Crime did not surge when California became a 'sanctuary state"* [Review of *Crime did not surge when California became a 'sanctuary state"*]. Www.Science.Org. https://www.science.org/content/article/crime-did-not-surge-when-california-became-sanctuary-state

Segura, C., & Pérez, N. E. (2025). The Role of Social Media as a Source of Information and Perception of Insecurity [Review of *The Role of Social Media as a Source of*

Information and Perception of Insecurity]. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, *31*(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-025-09628-x

Sommerfelt, T., Mjelva, M. B., Carling, J., & Aslany, M. (2025). Systematic literature reviews in migration studies: Approaches to context-sensitive synthesis. *Comparative Migration Studies*, *13*(1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-025-00502-7

Trump, D. J. (2017). Executive Order 13767 of January 25, 2017: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements. In *Federal Register* (Vol. 82, Issue 18, pp. 8793–8797). www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-01-30/pdf/2017-02095.pdf

UC Davis. (2024, April 4). *Farm Labor Issues in the 2020s - Summary Report*. Gifford.Ucdavis.Edu. https://gifford.ucdavis.edu/events/past/april-4-2024-farm-labor-issues-in-the-2020s/farm-labor-issues-in-the-2020s-summary-report/

U.S. Department of Agriculture. (2024). Specialty crops in California | USDA climate hubs. In *Usda.gov*. https://www.climatehubs.usda.gov/hubs/california/topic/specialty-crops-california

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (n.d.). *Statistics* [Review of *Statistics*]. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved July 12, 2026, from https://www.ice.gov/statistics

U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2020, July 13). *U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement* [Review of *U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement*]. Ice.Gov. https://www.ice.gov/about-ice

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2024). *ERO Field Offices* [Review of *ERO Field Offices*]. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFieldOffices.pdf

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2025, July 9). *Secure Communities* [Review of *Secure Communities*]. Www.Ice.Gov. https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2026). *Delegation of immigration authority section 287(g) immigration and nationality act*. Www.Ice.Gov. https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement compiled by The Deportation Project. (2026). *Dataset: Administrative arrests*. The Deportation Data Project. https://ice-arrests.apps.deportationdata.org/

Weersink, A., Massow, M. von, Bannon, N., Ifft, J., Maples, J., McEwan, K., & McKendree, M. G. S. (2021). Covid-19 and the agri-food system in the united states and Canada. *Agricultural Systems*, *188*(1), 103039. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2020.103039

Win, M. T., Rutledge, Z., & Maredia, M. K. (2025). Labor shortages and farmer adaptation strategies. *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy*, *47*(3), 896–913. https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.13527

Win, M. T., Rutledge, Z., & Martin, P. (2025). How California Farmers Are Adapting to a Shrinking Labor Force. *ARE Update*, *28*(6), 9–11. University of California Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zachariah-Rutledge/publication/394934020_California_Farm_Labor_Shortages/links/68aca5017984e374aceb3db0/California-Farm-Labor-Shortages.pdf

Woolery, S. (2025). Updated Responsibilities of Law Enforcement Agencies Under the California Values Act, California TRUST Act, and the California TRUTH Act. *2025-DLE-03*. California Department of Justice - Division of Law Enforcement. https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/2025-dle-03.pdf